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Abstract
Truth pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between domains of discourse:
while ordinary descriptive claims or those of the hard sciences might be true in
virtue of corresponding to reality, those concerning ethics, mathematics, institutions
(or modality, aesthetics, comedy…) might be true in some non-representational or
“anti-realist” sense. Despite pluralism attracting increasing amounts of attention, the
motivations for the view remain underdeveloped. This paper investigates whether plu-
ralism is well-motivated on ontological grounds: that is, on the basis that different
discourses are concerned with different kinds of entities. Arguments that draw on six
different ontological contrasts are examined: (i) concrete versus abstract entities; (ii)
mind-independent versus mind-dependent entities; (iii) sparse versus merely abun-
dant properties; (iv) objective versus projected entities; (v) natural versus non-natural
entities; and (vi) ontological pluralism (entities that literally exist in different ways).
I argue that the additional premises needed to move from such contrasts to truth plu-
ralism are either implausible or unmotivated, often doing little more than to bifurcate
the nature of truth when a more theoretically conservative option is available. If there
is a compelling motivation for pluralism, I suggest, it’s likely to lie elsewhere.
Keywords Truth pluralism · Ontological pluralism · Mind-dependence · Douglas
Edwards · Michael Lynch
1 Introduction
Some facts are more suspicious than others. Most of us are happy to concede that there
is a world out there, existing independently of what we happen to think about it, and
that when we’re talking about tables, chairs, cats, mountains, and perhaps electrons,
quarks, and so forth, what we’re trying to do is describe that world. But it’s hard to
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feel this way about everything we say. For one reason or another, it can be hard to
see how the ethical, the mathematical, or the institutional, as well as the modal, the
psychological, the aesthetic, the comedic, and so on, is a part of that world. And yet
it’s often equally hard to believe that all such talk involves misapprehension—that it
is an attempt to describe some aspect of the world that simply isn’t there.
One way to try and split the difference is to appeal to a non-representational theory
of truth in the problematic domains. Suppose it is a mind-independently given fact
that Felix, the cat, is furry and that Lexy, the electron, is negatively charged. If so, then
(1) and (2) might be true in virtue of accurately representing, or “corresponding to”,
those facts:
(1) Felix is furry.
(2) Lexy is negatively charged.
(3) 7 is prime.
(4) Kicking puppies is wrong.
(5) Prince William is married.
But instead of appealing to a mathematical, ethical, or institutional fact to explain why
(3), (4), or (5) is true, we might endorse some coherentist, pragmatist, or epistemic
conception of truth. Perhaps (3), (4), and (5) are true in virtue of cohering with the
relevant mathematical axioms, stable moral theory, or body of law. Most prominent in
this context is Crispin Wright’s (1992: p. 48) generalisation of the notion of a mathe-
matical proof: superassertibility. Roughly speaking, (3), (4), or (5) is assertible iff there
is some state of information that warrants believing or asserting it; it is superassert-
ible iff this warrant would survive no matter how much that state of information was
improved.1 The result is a kind of truth pluralism: what it is for something to be true
varies between domains.2
Many, including me, have found this picture intuitive enough to spend considerable
time and energy trying to figure out how the theory is best formulated and how to
respond to objections. Comparatively little, however, has been done to investigate the
motivations for truth pluralism—to see if the foundations are secure, before trying to
build elaborate structures and fend off attacks.3
There is good reason to think that we need more than the intuitive rationale just
given. When it comes to vindicating our competing “realist” and “anti-realist” intu-
itions in different domains, there is no shortage of other contenders. Moreover, if one’s
motivation is merely suspicion about the relevant entities and facts, then it’s not obvi-
ous that truth pluralism alone gets you what you want. If (3) is true at all, then by any
plausible logic it follows that there is something that is prime (namely, the number 7).
1 See Dorsey (2006), Lynch (2009: Chap. 8), and Gamester (2017: Chap. 5) for cognate suggestions.
2 Throughout this paper, my focus is on “inflationary” pluralisms that endorse both representational and
non-representational truth properties, which is the locus of most of the philosophical attention pluralism
has garnered thus far. Rather than: “correspondence” pluralisms, which endorse only representational truth
properties (e.g. Sher 1998); hybrid pluralisms, which endorse inflationary and deflationary truth proper-
ties (McGee 2005; Kölbel 2008; Ferrari and Moruzzi 2018); and deflationary pluralisms, which endorse
only deflationary truth properties (Beall 2013). Considering other kinds of pluralism would, unfortunately,
complicate the dialectic substantially; nonetheless, other pluralists may well find help or hindrance within.
3 Besides the work discussed below, only Pedersen (2014) and Ball (2017) have engaged seriously with
the question of the underlying motivations for pluralism.
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To that extent, at least, there is a mathematical object. Similarly, it follows that there
is something that 7 is (namely, prime)—so to that extent there is a mathematical prop-
erty. And if there is a mathematical object that exemplifies a mathematical property
then there is, in that sense, a mathematical fact. So, while we may not have appealed
to mathematical entities to explain why (3) is true, it’s not obvious that we’re off the
hook just for that.4
The most important demand for more motivation, however, comes from the fact
that the pluralist’s place in the explanatory story makes for an uncomfortable stopping
point. That is, even if we grant that the nature of truth varies between domains, the
obvious question is: Why? Why is it that truth is a matter of corresponding to the
facts in some domains, but is a matter of coherence or superassertibility in others?
What is it about mathematics, ethics, or the institutional, in contrast to, say, the hard
sciences, that makes discourse concerning the former apt for one truth property, while
the latter is apt for another? Are we to take the difference as brute? Explanation must
stop somewhere, but stopping here would surely be unsatisfying.
Two broad strategies present themselves. The first is metaphysical or ontological.
It appeals to differences in the nature of the entities—objects, properties, or facts,
say—that different discourses are concerned with; contrasting, say, the medium-sized
dry goods of everyday life with abstract objects like numbers, prescriptive properties
like wrongness, or mind-dependent properties like being married. The second is func-
tional or teleological. It appeals to differences in what the relevant thought and talk is
for; in particular, that while some discourses serve a representational function—mean-
ing we use the very referring terms of the discourse to explain its existence—others
serve a non-representational function.5
The strategies are by no means exclusive.6 Misgivings about the entities of some
domain might motivate a non-representational explanation of the purpose of the dis-
course; a non-representational explanation of the discourse might motivate a different
conception of the relevant entities. And different strategies might be better suited to
different domains: the metaphysical approach to mathematics, and the teleological to
ethics, say.
Establishing that there are substantive metaphysical or teleological differences
between domains—perhaps with accompanying epistemological or normative7 differ-
ences—is, I’ll assume, sufficient to render truth pluralism a salient theoretical option,
a live possibility worth taking seriously. But presumably the pluralist thinks it does
4 One could try to defuse this worry by arguing that the existential quantifier receives a “deflationary”
reading in such cases. This does not affect the dialectical point I am making here, since to do so is to
move beyond the kind of rough-and-ready, intuitive motivation with which we started, and instead draw on
substantive, philosophically interesting contrasts between domains—just as I’m suggesting we should.
5 The paradigm here is metaethical, or metanormative, expressivism: ‘although the teleology of spatial
perception is spatial, the teleology of ethical commitment is not ethical.’ (Blackburn 1993: p. 169).
6 Nor need they be exhaustive. Perhaps further strategies could appeal to, say, epistemological or normative
differences (perhaps includingWright’s (1992) cruces: evidence-transcendence, cognitive command, width
of cosmological role, etc.). However, I’m inclined to think that such differences between discourses will
likewise demand explanation, and that the natural explanatory strategies are, once more, ontological or
teleological. If so, then while epistemological or normative differences may be an important part of an
ontologically- or teleologically-driven strategy, ontology or teleology will be explanatorily fundamental.
7 On normative differences in this context, see e.g. Ferrari (2019), Pedersen (2020).
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more than that. The pluralist’s view is that such differences give us some reason to
prefer truth pluralism to its theoretical competitors, and in particular to global versions
of the theories the pluralist endorses only locally.
This paper sets out to see whether this is so, focusing on the metaphysical strategy
in particular. This narrowing of focus has tactical motivation. It is partly pragmatics:
we can only cover so much in one paper, and this approach provides plenty to engage
with. But it is also rhetorical. The metaphysical strategy has been more prominent in
the literature,8 but I strongly suspect the pluralist is better served by the teleological
strategy. By detailing the challenges facing the former, I hope to refocus pluralists’
efforts.
Any metaphysical motivation for truth pluralism will face a flat-footed challenge.
Granted, different discourses might be concerned with radically different kinds of
entities. But if we’re happy with the idea that truth at least sometimes consists in
correspondence with the facts, then why not think that it always does so, and that what
varies is simply the kinds of facts that different discourses correspond to? If we can
have variation in the entities or facts—in the “worldly” relatum of the correspondence
relation—thenwhy also think that we need variation in the nature of truth? This kind of
argument has sometimes been pressed as the “double-counting” or “Quine-Sainsbury”
objection to pluralism.9
I think the best way to view the metaphysical strategy is an attempt to meet this
challenge by arguing that ontological variation of one kind or another motivates truth
pluralism. The arguments for pluralism we’ll consider below thus exhibit a common
structure, with two core claims. First, that there is an important kind of ontological
variation between the entities of different discourses. Aswe’ll see, these range from the
familiar (some entities are mind-independent, others mind-dependent; some are con-
crete, others abstract) to the highly contentious (the nature of existence varies between
different entities). Second, that—given certain auxiliary premises—truth pluralism
follows: in particular, that truth should be understood representationally in discourses
concerning entities of one kind, and non-representationally in discourses concern-
ing entities of another. While the plausibility of the first step is, of course, crucial to
the overall pluralist programme, in the spirit of open-minded generosity we’ll mostly
grant to the pluralist that there are substantive ontological differences, of one kind or
another, between domains. Our primary focus will thus be the second step: whether
such differences give us any reason to prefer pluralism to its theoretical competitors.
Objects and properties vary along countless dimensions, which means the scope
for finding an ontologically-driven pluralism of this form is vast. To focus things,
we’ll draw on the pioneering work of Douglas Edwards (Sect. 2) and Michael Lynch
8 Though Lynch (2013, 2015, 2019) seems to be shifting towards the teleological strategy (see also Wright
1998: p. 191). Other exceptions are Ball (2017) and Gamester (2017).
9 See Quine (1960: pp. 118–119); Sainsbury (1996); Dodd (2013); Asay (2018); Bar-On and Simmons
(2019). Unlike some of these presentations, I’ve tried to meet pluralists more on their own terms. (I do not,
for instance, assume the adequacy of a deflationary conception of truth or truthmaker theory.) Let me hereby




(Sect. 3).10 Asmotivation for pluralism, we’ll consider that certain entities: (i) literally
exist in a different way; (ii) are projected; (iii) are merely abundant; (iv) are mind-
dependent; (v) are non-natural; and (vi) are abstract. (i)–(iii) are the focus of Sect. 2.We
consider them as grounds for Edwards’s claim that what is so is sometimes grounded
in what is true, and thus that truth is sometimes non-representational. (iii)–(vi) are
discussed in Sect. 3. There, we consider Lynch’s argument that (a) representational or
correspondence theories of truth should be cashed out in causal-representational terms,
(b) causal representationalism does not apply in certain discourses, and therefore (c)
that truth should be understood non-representationally in such discourses.We consider
(iii)–(vi) as grounds for (b).
We hereby survey a wide variety of ontologically-driven arguments for pluralism.
None, I’ll argue, is compelling. Even when the ontological variation in question is
highly contentious, the auxiliary premises needed to move from such a claim to truth
pluralism are either implausible or unattractive—sometimes only serving to bifurcate
the nature of truth when there is, by the pluralist’s own lights, a more theoretically con-
servative option available. We thereby vindicate the “double-counting” worry that the
metaphysical strategy renders truth pluralism something of a theoretical spinning-
wheel (while leaving open that the theory may find more compelling motivation
elsewhere).
2 Being grounded in truth?
Consider the T-schema:
(T) ‘p’ is true iff p
One way of trying to argue for truth pluralism on ontological grounds is to argue
that, due to the nature of the relevant entities, while certain instances of (T) need to
be read with a left-to-right order of explanatory dependence (e.g. ‘iron is magnetic’ is
true because iron is magnetic), other instances need to read with a right-to-left order
of explanatory dependence (e.g. motorbikes are cool because ‘motorbikes are cool’ is
true). In the former cases, what is true depends on what is so, and thus—the reasoning
goes—we ought to endorse a representational conception of truth. However, in the
latter cases, what is so depends on what is true; so our account of what it is for such
sentences to be true cannot be representational, on pain of circularity. If we’re to give
a substantive account of what it is for such sentences to be true, then, truth must be
understood non-representationally.
This is the strategy that has been developed, in a couple of different ways, by
Douglas Edwards. As we’ll see, the crucial element of this argumentative structure is
in arguing for the right-to-left explanatory reading of certain instances of (T). Edwards
is hereby taking up an anti-realist tradition, which maintains that, in certain domains,
what is so depends in an important sense on what we say or think is so (or on our social
10 Nikolaj Pedersen also suggests that truth pluralism should be partly founded in a kind of “metaphysical
pluralism”—see especially Pedersen (2014). However, since his goal is only to show the latter ‘fitswell’ with
the former, rather than to provide anything like an argument (2014: p. 271), I have not found it productive
to engage directly with Pedersen’s suggestive work here.
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practices more broadly); that the distinctions we’re drawing are not an antecedently
given part of the mind-independent world, but instead created by us.
Nonetheless, this strategy runs into a recurrent difficulty. The problem is that the
peculiarly alethic part of this explanatory story—which says that what is so depends
on the truth of certain sentences (propositions, beliefs)—looks redundant. It is quite
possible to think that the coolness of motorbikes (say) depends on us and our social
practices without thinking that it depends specifically on the truth of the sentence
‘motorbikes are cool’. Indeed, I’ll argue that any such explanatory story that incorpo-
rates an alethic element has a more economical counterpart that does not. But without
the alethic element of the story, the argument for truth pluralism cannot get up and
running: we can endorse the left-to-right explanatory reading of the T-schema across
the board. Truth pluralism thus becomes a theoretical spinning-wheel.
That’s the general dialectic that we’ll see play out below. Now for details.
2.1 On ontological pluralism
Let’s start with an argument developed jointly by Edwards and Aaron Cotnoir (Cot-
noir and Edwards 2015). The ontological variation Cotnoir and Edwards (2015:
pp. 119–120) discuss is the most radical variety going: a kind of ontological plu-
ralism which says that the very nature of existence varies between different entities.
In particular, for concrete entities like tennis balls or the Eiffel Tower, it is captured by
what they call “Alexander’s Dictum” (AD), while for abstract entities like numbers, it
is captured by the “Neo-Fregean Principle” (NFP):
(AD) To exist is to have causal powers
(NFP) To exist is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in a true sentence
Granting ontological pluralism, one can readily get a sense of how the argument for
truth pluralism is going to go. The basic idea is that what is true is sometimes grounded
in what exists—i.e., when the relevant entities exist in the sense of (AD)—but what
exists is sometimes grounded in what is true—i.e., when the relevant entities exist in
the sense of (NFP). Truth is thus sometimes representational (in the former cases),
and sometimes non-representational (in the latter cases). I’ll run through this in more
detail in a moment.
However, Cotnoir and Edwards in fact formulate their argument in a curious way.
Calling the kind of existence captured by (AD), BEING1, and the kind of existence
captured by (NFP), BEING2, their argument for truth pluralism (2015: p. 128, lightly
edited) relies on the idea that these two kinds of existence are equi-fundamental:
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(I) BEING1 and BEING2 are equi-fundamental Premise
(II) BEING1 grounds TRUTHi Premise
(III) TRUTHj grounds BEING2 Premise
(IV) TRUTHi TRUTHj Assumption for reductio
(V) BEING1 grounds BEING2 From (II), (III), (IV), transitivity of grounding
(VI) If x grounds y, then x is more fundamental
than y
Definition of ‘grounding’
(VII) BEING1 is more fundamental than BEING2 From (V), (VI)
(VIII) Contradiction From (I), (VII)
(IX) TRUTHi TRUTHj Reductio from (I)–(VIII)
The rationale for premise (III) is just (NFP): what exists is sometimes grounded
in what is true. Assumption (IV) is truth monism: the view that the nature of truth is
uniform. The rationale for premise (II) takes some reconstruction. Recall (1):
(1) Felix is furry
If things like cats exist in the sense of (AD), then Felix’s existence presumably does
not depend on the truth of (1). It’s thus natural to think that (1) is true at least in part
because Felix exists—truth comes after existence in the explanatory order of things.
If that’s right, then the truth of (1) is grounded in BEING1, as premise (II) states.
Granting that, and given the equi-fundamentality premise (I), it’s easy to see how the
truth monist is led into contradiction.
The argument is neat, but unfortunately including premise (I) renders the overall
picture here unstable. We’re left with a straightforward dilemma. (NFP) accounts for
the existence of certain entities in terms of certain true sentences. If these sentences are
to be true, then they must exist. But what kind of existence do they have? If BEING2,
thenwe’re off on a vicious regress. If, however, the regress stops because some relevant
sentence has BEING1, then BEING2 is grounded in BEING1 after all, violating (I).11
Fortunately, it seems that the equi-fundamentality premise is not only problematic
but unnecessary, as far as the argument for truth pluralism is concerned. Suppose that
the above reasoning for premise (II) is correct, so the truth of (1) is grounded in the
existence of Felix, as per (let’s grant) a representational conception of truth. Now
recall (3):
(3) 7 is prime
If things like numbers exist in the sense of (NFP), then 7’s existence is grounded in
its being the referent of a singular term in a true sentence. The theory does not tell us
which true sentence(s), but suppose for the sake of argument that it’s (3) (or that (3)
is among them).12 We thus cannot explain the truth of (3) by appealing to the number
11 The dilemma does not appeal to any peculiar features of sentences qua truthbearers, sowould presumably
recur if we subbed in propositions or whatever else instead. At this, but only this, point in the paper, the
authors seem to take (I) to be essential to ontological pluralism, in which case the dilemma threatens
refutation. But it seems dispensable.
12 It’s interesting that, if the argumentworked, strictly it would only show that somemathematical sentences
are true in a non-representational sense.
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7 and what it is like, on pain of circularity. Therefore, in this instance truth arguably
cannot consist in accurate representation of an antecedently given reality. So—the
pluralist reasons—it must consist in something else, something non-representational.
It is consistent with this argument that (3) itself has BEING1, and thus that all BEING2
is ultimately grounded in BEING1. (Or so it seems, and I’m willing to grant for the
sake of argument.)
There is, however, a deeper worry than any concerning the details of the argument
itself. Recall that, for the ontological pluralist, (NFP) only tells us what existence
consists in for certain entities—just to have a name, call them the constructed enti-
ties. On pain of circularity, it follows that truth cannot be representational for those
sentences whose truth grounds the existence of a constructed entity. (That’s the argu-
ment for truth pluralism.) So, for such sentences, let’s suppose that truth consists in
some non-representational property, like superassertibility. It must follow that, for any
constructed entity x, x exists iff x is the referent of a singular term that appears in a
sentence that is superassertible. But now we face a challenge. For given that we are
committed to the truth of this biconditional, why not go in for (NFP*) instead of (NFP)
as our account of what it is for a constructed entity to exist?:
(NFP*) To exist is to be the referent of a singular term that appears in a superassertible
sentence
If we endorse (NFP*) instead of (NFP), then while the existence of the number 7
still depends on (3) being superassertible, the truth of (3) can in turn depend on the
existence of the number 7. Thus, even while the nature of existence varies, what is true
can be uniformly grounded in what exists. Truth can thus be representational across
the board.
The question, then, is what could motivate (NFP) over its rival. The underlying
ontological pluralism remains just as radical. The principal difference is just that (NFP)
engenders a bifurcation in the nature of truth where (NFP*) does not. Theoretical
economy demands the simpler option.
One possible objection to (NFP*) is that other sentences, like those concerning
the furriness of cats, can be superassertible (or whatever) without the relevant entities
existing. But both sides agree that superassertibility is sometimes sufficient for exis-
tence (numbers), but sometimes not (cats). That, we’re supposing, is a consequence of
the ontological pluralism. The difference is just that the advocate of (NFP) maintains
that it is onlywhen truth reduces to superassertibility that the latter is sufficient for exis-
tence, while the advocate of (NFP*) maintains that this gets the order of explanation
the wrong way around: it is because superassertibility is only sufficient for existence
in some cases that in those cases the sentences wind up being true. Again, the upshot
of doing things this way is that truth remains uniform, to (NFP*)’s credit. Nor will it
help to say that the truth of (3) entails 7’s existence, whereas its superassertibility does
not. The game is metaphysics, and as a matter of metaphysical necessity, both sides
think (3) being superassertible is sufficient for 7’s existence. As a matter of conceptual
necessity (or similar), the observation isn’t pertinent.
So, even granting that the patched version of Cotnoir and Edwards’s argument
works, truth pluralism comes across as a spinning wheel in the ontological plural-
ist’s theoretical machinery, as predicted. Now, perhaps we could go back-and-forth
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on (NFP) and (NFP*) some more (though I’ve been unable to conjure up anything
convincing on (NFP)’s behalf myself). At this point, however, I think we’re better
served by looking for less controversial starting points.
2.2 Edwards’s “strong” argument
2.2.1 On objective and projected properties
To provide an ontological foundation for truth pluralism, one need not go so far as to
say that the very nature of existence varies. Less controversial is the idea that entities,
which may all exist in the same way, come in importantly different varieties: while
some are concrete, others are abstract; while some are mind-independent, others are
mind-dependent. It is to such premises we now turn.
In his recent book, Edwards (2018) provides a “strong” argument for truth pluralism
on the grounds that there are importantly different kinds of properties.13 Focusing on
(utterances of) sentences of the form ‘a is F’, and assuming that predicates like ‘is F’
refer to properties like Fness, Edwards (67) says that we can distinguish three options
vis-à-vis the property referred to by any particular predicate: (a) it is objective; (b) it is
projected; or (c) there isn’t one. (c) is an error-theoretical option that we’ll set aside.
What is it for a property to be objective or projected? Edwards (68) explicates the
difference via the biconditional (P):
(P) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff the object referred
to by ‘a’ has the property referred to by ‘F’
A property, Fness, is objective iff there is a left-to-right order of explanatory depen-
dence on (P): if a falls under the predicate ‘is F’, then it does so because it has the
property of Fness. Fness is projected iff there is the opposite direction of explanatory
dependence: a has the property of Fness, if it does, because it falls under the predicate
‘F’. So the property of being magnetic is objective iff things fall under the predicate
‘is magnetic’ because they are magnetic; it is projected iff things are magnetic because
they fall under the predicate ‘is magnetic’.
By this criterion, magnetism is objective: something’s being magnetic does not
depend on us or which predicates we have. A property’s being objective is hereby
supposed to capture a kind of realism. Edwards’s conception of projected properties,
by contrast, taps into the anti-realist traditionmentioned above: that, at least sometimes,
whenwe carve up theworld, the categorieswe use do not latch onto distinctions that are
already out there—limning nature at its joints—but instead create those distinctions.
Edwards goes on to argue that truth is representational when the sentence in ques-
tion concerns an objective property; non-representational when it concerns a projected
property. We’ll consider the argument below (Sect. 2.2.3). First, however, it’s impor-
tant to consider the ontological distinction that constitutes the basis of the argument
(Sects. 2.2.1, 2.2.2).
It is, as noted, highly plausible that there are objective properties. The reason that
iron falls under the predicate ‘is magnetic’ is because iron is magnetic. Of course,
13 All citations in this section to Edwards (2018), unless otherwise noted.
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this isn’t a complete explanation: we also need a metasemantic explanation of why
‘is magnetic’ refers to that property. After all, if we had used language differently,
‘is magnetic’ might have referred to the property of being invisible, and then iron
would not fall under ‘is magnetic’, though it would still be magnetic. However, I’ve
found it much more difficult to find a plausible example of a projected property in
Edwards’s sense. This matters, since in Edwards’s own taxonomy any property that is
not projected is objective; and so, by his own argument, truth for the relevant sentences
is representational. Unless we have reason to think that some property is projected,
Edwards’s argument for truth pluralism cannot get going.
A property, Fness, is projected iff any object a that is F is F because it falls under
the predicate ‘is F’. The most plausible contender, I think, is the “self-referential”
property: falling under this predicate. If any object falls under this predicate, then
trivially it does so because it falls under this predicate; i.e., because it falls under ‘falls
under this predicate’. But I doubt that there are any such objects, and thus no true
instance of ‘x falls under this predicate’.
But what other property might be like this? Edwards’s (68) example is being cool:
One example here is the property of being cool: motorbikes have the property
of being cool because motorbikes fall under the predicate ‘is cool’; rather than
vice versa.
But this, I submit, is simply false. If motorbikes are cool, then what makes them
cool is presumably the way they look, the sound theymake, the freedom they give you,
the associated clothing, the kind of personwho rides them, that sort of thing.While I’m
hardly an expert on the matter, I’m reasonably certain that falling within the extension
of a predicate—even the predicate ‘is cool’—is not the kind of thing that makes
something cool.14 Similar objections apply to Edwards’s other purportedly projected
properties, which are primarily properties that are plausibly socially constructed; e.g.
being the Governor of New York or being a woman (72–73).15
Now, one might concede the general point while still suggesting that falling under
‘is cool’ is part of what makes motorbikes cool. But why think this? For one thing, that
there are other things that makemotorbikes cool is necessary (motorbikes could hardly
be cool simply in virtue of falling under the predicate); and once they are in place the
other factors are sufficient (if theyweren’t, then falling under the predicate could hardly
tip the balance). There’s no explanatory work for falling under the predicate to do here.
Alternatively, one might argue that the kinds of thing that explain why motorbikes are
cool do so by explaining why they fall under the predicate ‘is cool’ (perhaps because
they explain why ‘motorbikes are cool’ is true), which in turn explains why they are
cool. This looks coherent, but it’s difficult to see what independent motivation it has.
The additional cogs in the theoretical machinery are redundant.
14 The fact that motorbikes fall within the extension of ‘is cool’ is pretty cool, simply because the phe-
nomenon of linguistic representation is pretty cool. But that isn’t what makes motorbikes themselves cool.
15 According to Edwards (67–69), moral expressivists that are happy to say that there are moral properties,
like Blackburn (1993: p. 181) and Gibbard (2006), are committed to such properties being projected. On
the contrary, expressivists are typically at pains to argue that expressivism doesn’t entail that morality is
mind-dependent (let alone language-dependent).
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It’s worth stressing that what I am querying here is Edwards’s particular concep-
tion of projection—the one on which his argument for truth pluralism rests—which
explains property exemplification in terms of predicate satisfaction. Nonetheless, an
anonymous referee worries that I am begging the question against ‘broadly response-
dependent (or other forms of non-realist metaphysics)’ of properties like coolness,
according to which what is cool depends, in some sense, on what we judge or say is
cool, or on our social practices more broadly. This is a concern worth taking seriously.
One may suspect that there could be some anti-realist metaphysics of properties like
coolness that entails that they are projected in Edwards’s sense; and thus, even if we’re
not convinced by Edwards’s example, projection may stand on firmer ground than it
appears here. On the contrary, however, it is quite possible to subscribe to an anti-
realist metaphysics of Fness without thinking that Fness is projected; indeed, there
is good reason to think that any anti-realist metaphysics of Fness that does entail that
Fness is projected ought to be replaced by another, closely-related, metaphysics that
does not. Let me explain.
Suppose that Fness is projected, so any object that is F is so because it falls under
‘F’. Now, let ‘ϕ’ abbreviate whatever conditions need to be satisfied to fully explain
why some object a falls under ‘F’. Since Fness is ex hypothesi projected, we know
that ϕ does not mention that a is F. We also know that it does not mention that a falls
under ‘F’, on pain of circularity. But beyond that, ϕ can build in pretty much whatever
conditions you like. That is, it may well be that what falls under ‘F’ depends, in some
sense, on what we judge or say is F, or on our social practices more broadly. It can,
for instance, include that certain subjects would have certain responses to a in certain
circumstances. To make the point explicit: we can build into ϕ whatever anti-realist
story about properties like coolness one prefers.
Now, if a falls under ‘F’, then (by disquotation) a is F. And if ϕ holds then a falls
under ‘F’. Therefore, if ϕ holds, then a is F; that is, ϕ is sufficient for a’s being F.
However, since ϕ does not mention that a falls under ‘F’, and Fness is projected, it
follows that ϕ is not explanatorily sufficient for a’s being F. We’re thus led to the view
that, despite ϕ’s being sufficient for a’s being F, we have to add the fact that a falls
under ‘F’ to ϕ—call this, ϕ+—before we can fully explain why a is F.
But now, I hope it is clear, there is a straightforward challenge: given that ϕ is
sufficient for a’s being F, why take ϕ + to be adequate to the explanatory task when ϕ
is not? The claim that Fness is projected seems to introduce an extra explanatory step
where none is needed. The simpler theory is the one that says that ϕ is explanatorily
sufficient for a’s being F. And note that this is especially so if Edwards is right that
the property’s being projected would entail that truth in the relevant discourse must be
non-representational (see Sect. 2.2.3), for then adding in this (seemingly redundant)
explanatory step would also engender a bifurcation in the nature of truth. The critical
point is that falling back on ϕ, rather than ϕ+, is perfectly compatible with ϕ giving
us a response-dependent, or otherwise anti-realist, metaphysics of Fness. But unless
there are projected properties in Edwards’s sense, the argument for truth pluralism
cannot get up and running.
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2.2.2 From abundance to projection?
Despite its central place in his argument for pluralism, Edwards gives little defence of
projectedproperties per se, because he thinks the distinctionbetweenobjective andpro-
jected properties ‘broadly correspond[s] to the distinction between sparse and abundant
properties’ (68). This is striking. Unlike Edwards’s rather idiosyncratic, linguistically-
mediated conception of projection, the distinction between sparse andmerely abundant
properties is reasonably well-entrenched in contemporary metaphysics. If Edwards is
right that these distinctions align, and can thereby root his argument for truth pluralism
in this less controversial ontological distinction, truth pluralism will stand on much
firmer ground. In open-minded spirit, then, it’s worth considering Edwards’s reasons
for endorsing this alignment.
First, then: what is the distinction? On an abundant conception of properties, any
(consistent) predicate whatsoever refers to a property, no matter how gerrymandered
those entities in its extension. If we define the predicate ‘is quurkey’ as: for any x,
x is quurkey iff (x is a quark or x is a turkey), then ‘is quurkey’ refers to a property
(quurkeyness); despite the fact that, intuitively at least, there is nothing substantive and
interesting that just the quarks and turkeys have in common. On a sparse conception of
properties, by contrast, properties ground genuine similarities between entities and are
of causal-explanatory significance. Being a quark is a property, as is being a turkey; but
quurkeyness, no. One problem with a sparse conception of properties, for Edwards, is
that we must deny that some predicates refer to properties, which leaves them in need
of a semantic value. But on an abundant conception of properties, we cannot make
sense of the difference between a causal-explanatorily significant property like being
a quark and a gerrymandered property like being quurkey. Thus Edwards (35), taking
his lead from Lewis (1983), endorses a pluralistic approach. Any predicate refers to
a property, but a proper subset of such properties is privileged, grounding genuine
similarity relations, and so on. The latter are the “sparse” properties, while the rest are
“merely abundant”.
It’s certainly not apparent at first sight that this distinction does, in fact, “broadly
correspond” to Edwards’s own distinction between objective and projected properties.
IfGobbles is quurkey, then the complete explanation ofwhyhe is so is that he is a turkey
(or that he is a quark, if he is a quark). There’s no explanatory role for falling under
‘quurkey’ to play here. So why think that merely abundant properties are projected?
We’ve thus far said nothing about what sparse and abundant properties are, except
that sparse properties ground genuine similarities and are causal-explanatorily signif-
icant, while abundant properties do/are not. Edwards (37) is neutral on whether sparse
properties are best understood as universals, tropes, or natural classes. But when it
comes to abundant properties, he foregrounds “predicate nominalism” (34–35):
On this view, there are properties insofar as there are extensions of predicates:
to have the property of being red is to be in the extension of ‘red’ […] On this
view of properties, it is not the case that an object is in the extension of ‘is F’
because it has the property of being F; rather the object has the property of being
F because it falls under the predicate ‘is F’.
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According to predicate nominalists, all and only the properties in existence are
those that are referred to by our predicates. And it certainly seems that, to avoid this
being a massive and ever-evolving coincidence where properties conveniently pop in
and out of existence as which predicates we have changes over time, we may well be
tempted by the projective reading of (P)—an object a is F because it falls under the
predicate ‘is F’—as Edwards suggests (the considerations at the end of Sect. 2.2.1
notwithstanding). So, if we endorse predicate nominalism as a theory of abundant
properties, then it looks like merely abundant properties are, in fact, projected.
This is an intriguing move. While this is not the place to settle the metaphysics of
properties,16 we ought to make the following three observations. First, I’ve tried to
motivate Edwards’s move from predicate nominalism to projection by pointing out
that the perfect alignment the predicate nominalist postulates betweenwhich properties
there are and which predicates we have threatens to be incredible unless we endorse
the right-to-left explanatory reading of the biconditional (P). However, some predicate
nominalists might reject this move by denying that there is anything to explain. If to
exemplify a property F just is to fall within the extension of the predicate ‘F’, then
arguably the relevant instances of the biconditional are trivial: to say that a exemplifies
the property of Fness just is to say that a falls within the extension of ‘F’.17 Second,
note that the paradigm instances of merely abundant properties are gerrymandered
properties like quurkeyness. It is at least unusual to think that all the properties we
talk about in a particular domain—like mathematical properties, ethical properties, or
socially constructed properties—are all like this. Is the pluralist committed to thinking
that moral goodness is like quurkeyness, grouping together a hodgepodge of things
that share no genuine similarity? (Edwards, in fact, has his own reasons for drawing
such an alignment—see fn. 25.) If not, then in rooting projection—and hence truth
pluralism—inmerely abundant properties, Edwardsmay fail to vindicate the intuitions
that draw many to the view in the first place.
Third, when it comes to the metaphysics of abundant properties, predicate nomi-
nalism is not the only game in town (as Edwards notes in a footnote to the passage
quoted above). The class nominalist, for instance, maintains that any class of entities
share a property: abundant properties are classes. An object can be a member of the
class of quarks and turkeys without our having a predicate ascribing the property; as,
indeed, all turkeys and quarks were until quite recently. In which case, the alignment
between abundance and projection breaks down.
Now, while at various points Edwards seems to have predicate nominalism in par-
ticular in mind, he talks in general (e.g., 86) as though any conception of abundant
properties will entail that they are projected. Indeed, in a striking footnote when he
introduces the objective/projected distinction, Edwards (68) suggests that abundant
properties are projected even if:
16 Predicate nominalism faces serious worries (e.g., Armstrong 1978: Chap. 2; Edwards 2014: Chap. 5.2)
but (i) so do other theories of properties; and (ii) these are normally levelled against predicate nominalism
as a monistic theory of properties, rather than as part of a pluralistic theory. So I won’t bother running
through independent objections here.
17 Of course, if trivial then the relevant instances of (P) are incompatible with an objective reading too. So
on this approach Edwards’s taxonomy of properties threatens to be non-exhaustive.
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we are thinking about properties as classes, and classes as mind-independent.
This is because, even if there is a vast number of classes, we still need to make
sense of a predicate selecting a particular class, and thus having the particular
extension it does, which will be dependent on our practices.
But the reasoning here is difficult to follow. As mentioned above, when it comes to
predicates and properties, one salient class of questions is metasemantic: we can ask
of any particular predicate why it refers to the property it does (‘magnetic’ to being
magnetic; ‘quurkey’ to quurkeyness). If this is what Edwards means by ‘mak[ing]
sense of a predicate selecting a particular class’, then he is correct that the answer
to this question will mention our practices. But this must be kept separate from the
question of why an object exemplifies that property: why iron is magnetic, or Gobbles
is quurkey. That we explain the meaning of ‘quurkey’ in terms of our practices does
not make Gobbles’s being quurkey dependent on our practices, any more than our
doing so for ‘magnetic’ makes iron’s being magnetic dependent on us. The answers
might be connected—for instance, if predicate nominalism is true—but we cannot
presuppose this.
In sum, then: Edwards’s grounds for endorsing projected properties comes from a
certain, highly controversial, metaphysics of abundant properties: predicate nominal-
ism. In the spirit of generosity, let’s grant this.
2.2.3 The argument
Having found grounds of at least some kind for Edwards’s distinction between objec-
tive and projected properties, we can turn—finally—to the ensuing argument for truth
pluralism.
For the sake of illustration, let’s suppose: (i) that being magnetic is an objective
property and that a bit of iron—call it ‘Irene’—exemplifies this property; and (ii) that
being cool is a projected property and that a motorbike—call it ‘Jeff’—exemplifies
this property. The argument to truth pluralism is then as follows (84–88). Suppose all
instances of the following schematic biconditionals are true:
(FT) The object referred to by ‘a’ falls under the predicate ‘F’ iff ‘F’ is true of the
object referred to by ‘a’
(TO) ‘F’ is true of the object referred to by ‘a’ iff ‘a is F’ is true
(TP) ‘a is F’ is true iff the object referred to by ‘a’ has the property referred to by
‘F’
Irene has the property referred to by ‘is magnetic’. Since being magnetic is objective,
by (P) this explains why Irene falls under the predicate ‘is magnetic’. Given (FT), this
in turn explains why ‘is magnetic’ is true of Irene; and given (TO), this explains why
‘Irene ismagnetic’ is true. Assuming the transitivity of explanation, ‘Irene ismagnetic’
is thus true because the object referred to by ‘Irene’ has the property referred to by ‘is
magnetic’. This is an instance of (TP), with explanatory dependence from left-to-right:
(TPi) ‘Irene is magnetic’ is true because the object referred to by ‘Irene’ has the
property referred to by ‘is magnetic’
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By contrast, Jeff has the property referred to by ‘is cool’. Since being cool is projected,
by (P) this must be because Jeff falls under the predicate ‘is cool’. This leaves us
with the question of why Jeff falls under the predicate ‘is cool’. Given (FT), Edwards
suggests we appeal to ‘is cool’ being true of Jeff; in turn, given (TO), Edwards suggests
that ‘is cool’ is true of Jeff because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true. Given the transitivity of
explanation, we can thus say that the object referred to by ‘Jeff’ has the property
referred to by ‘is cool’ because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true. This is another instance of (TP),
but this time with the explanatory dependence from right-to-left:
(TPii) The object referred to by ‘Jeff’ has the property referred to by ‘is cool’ because
‘Jeff is cool’ is true
We can therefore read a different order of explanatory dependence into (TP) when the
property is objective (left-to-right) and when it is projected (right-to-left). So, what is
true is sometimes grounded in what is so, and what is so is sometimes grounded in
what is true. In particular, the truth of ‘a is F’ depends on how things stand with a
and Fness when Fness is objective, suggesting a representational conception of truth.
By contrast, how things stand with a and Fness depends on whether or not ‘a is F’ is
true when Fness is projected, suggesting a non-representational conception of truth.
Thus, if some objects are objective and others are projected, then truth is sometimes
representational, and sometimes non-representational.
Clearly the crucial move in this argument is from the claim that Jeff is cool because
he falls under the predicate ‘is cool’, to his being cool because ‘Jeff is cool’ is true,
via (FT) and (TO). Edwards (86) goes so far as to suggest that the idea that truth ‘is
dependent on predicate satisfaction, is compatible only with the [objective] concep-
tion of properties… and not with the [projected] one.’ This is, at best, hasty. Granted,
by definition we cannot explain why Jeff falls under ‘is cool’ in terms of Jeff’s being
cool, since we’re assuming coolness is projected. But for all that’s been said there
may be some other explanation (as Edwards (88) seems to concede in a footnote).
This becomes pressing when we consider the limitations of Edwards’s proposal. For
instance, Edwards requires that we have a singular term for every entity x in the exten-
sion of ‘is cool’, otherwise there is no relevant sentence of the form ‘x is cool’ to be
true. This looks implausible, but it’s not obvious howwe’re to avoid the difficulty with-
out taking on new, substantive assumptions about truthbearers. For instance, we might
shift from sentences to propositions, conceived of as structured entities composed
of necessarily existent abstract objects like Fregean senses. We need details—such a
move is non-trivial. However, I raise this worry only to set it aside.
The central difficulty for this line of argument is that Edwards faces an analogous
challenge to the one we raised for Cotnoir and Edwards above. By his own lights,
the truth of ‘Jeff is cool’ must be understood in non-representational terms; say in
terms of superassertibility. But then there is a rival, non-alethic explanation of why
Jeff falls under ‘is cool’ on the cards: we can say that it is because ‘Jeff is cool’ is
superassertible, rather than because ’Jeff is cool’ is true. Again, the specifically alethic
element in Edwards’s explanatory story looks explanatorily idle. The rival proposal
lets the property that is, by the pluralist’s own lights, co-extensive with truth in the
relevant cases play the relevant explanatory role; and in doing so does not demand a
bifurcation in the nature of truth. If we explain Jeff’s falling under ‘is cool’ in terms
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of ‘Jeff is cool’ being superassertible, then—as with objective properties—we can
explain why ‘is cool’ is true of Jeff and hence why ‘Jeff is cool’ is true via the relevant
instances of (FT) and (TO). That Fness is projected is thus perfectly compatible with
‘a is F’ being true in a representational sense.
So, even if we grant predicate nominalism about merely abundant properties, and
the argument frompredicate nominalism to projection, and we think that the properties
of the relevant domain aremerely abundant,wedonot here have a compelling argument
for truth pluralism.
2.3 Conclusion to Sect. 2
In this section, we’ve considered three “ontological” reasons for thinking that while
what is true sometimes depends on what is so, what is so sometimes depends on
what is true, and thus that truth is sometimes representational and sometimes non-
representational: that different entities literally exist in different ways; that some
entities are objective while others are projected; and that some properties are sparse
while others aremerely abundant.While not hopeless, the arguments are unpersuasive:
it is quite possible to give an anti-realist gloss on the relevant entities without having
to think that their existence depends specifically on the truth of various sentences—in-
deed, by the pluralist’s own lights the latter just seems to introduce an extra, otherwise
redundant step into the explanation—and without this specifically alethic element in
the explanatory story, the argument for truth pluralism cannot get off the ground.
3 Truth and causation
Our attempts to find an ontological motivation for truth pluralism have thus far been
unsuccessful. But notice thatwe have been focusing exclusively on the purported relata
of the correspondence relation, to the exclusion of the relation itself. (I’ll use ‘corre-
spondence’ as a label for the relation that holds between a truthbearer and “the world”
when the former is true in a substantive, representational sense.) This is dialectically
significant. If correspondence ought to be understood a certain way, then this may set
constraints on what can stand in the relation, thus restricting the theory’s potential
scope. This is the line pursued by Lynch (2009).18 In particular, Lynch argues from
(a) a causal-representational interpretation of correspondence, and (b) the claim that
causal representationalism does not apply to certain beliefs, to argue that (c) truth for
the relevant beliefs is non-representational.
In this section, we’ll consider this alternative argumentative strategy. We’ll proceed
as follows. In Sect. 3.1, we’ll set out Lynch’s argument. In Sect. 3.2, we’ll consider a
variety of ontological grounds for (b). Finally, Sect. 3.3 evaluates, and articulates three
objections to, Lynch’s argument. Ultimately, we’ll see that we run into similar difficul-
ties to those above.While the causal-representational conception of correspondence is
effective in setting constraints on its scope, the restriction itself appears unmotivated:
in particular, the pluralist appears to be committed to the adequacy of a non-causal
18 All citations in this section to Lynch (2009), unless otherwise noted.
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interpretation of correspondence in just those cases where the causal interpretation
gives out. Moreover, as far as I can see this issue is structural, and will therefore affect
any argument for pluralism that proceeds along these lines.
3.1 Causal representationalism
Lynch focuses on beliefs composed of concepts, which we’ll denote with angle
brackets: <furry> is the concept of furriness.19 According to Lynch (22–32), the cor-
respondence theory of truth finds its most plausible contemporary guise in causalist
interpretations of what have been called “building block” theories of representation.
Such a theory will tell you what it is for <Felix> to represent Felix, and <furry> to
represent furriness. The representational content of the belief that Felix is furry is then
a function of these components: it is true iff the object <Felix> represents exempli-
fies the property <furry> represents. Lynch (25) gives us a toy version of a causalist
interpretation of such a theory, which I’ve adapted for our example:
CAUSAL: <furry> denotes furriness  instances of furriness cause, under appropri-
ate conditions, mental tokenings of <furry>
Causal theories of representation are familiar from the literature. Just as a photo might
represent Amy rather than her identical twin Annie, not because of any relevant sim-
ilarity between the photo and Amy that does not hold between the photo and Annie,
but because Amy was causally involved in the production of the photograph in the
right way (Stampe 1977: p. 43), so too <furry> represents furriness because furriness
is appropriately involved in the production of thoughts involving <furry>. Such is the
broad idea.20 Call this, the causal-representational theory of correspondence.
CAUSAL constrains what can stand in the correspondence relation, so understood:
for the belief that a is G to correspond to reality requires that the concept <G> is
causally responsive to Gs, so Gs must be the type of thing with which something can
causally interact. Lynch’s driving thought is that CAUSAL, and thus the correspon-
dence conception of truth, is hereby limited in scope:
‘[…] where responsiveness is not plausible – either because the [mental] states
in question aren’t appropriately causally responsive or because the external envi-
ronment contains no Gs that can be so causally responsive – then it is less likely
that mental-states with Gish content have that content because they represent Gs.
Some other explanation of their content becomesmore likely. And – to anticipate
the central lesson – if we nonetheless wish to maintain that the relevant mental
states are true, some other account of what makes them true must be pushed
onto the field.’ (33)21
19 Lynch primarily talks in terms of beliefs, only sometimes propositions. He also suggests (23) that the
considerations apply mutatis mutandis to sentences.
20 Lynch (26) also considers a toy teleosemantic theory, but its implications for our purposes are no different
from CAUSAL.
21 See also Lynch (2001: p. 724; 2004: p. 285). By ‘the [mental] states in question aren’t appropriately
causally responsive’ to the external environment, I suspect that Lynch has partly in mind the contention
that takes centre-stage in Lynch (2013): that thought in some domains in non-representational. This would
form part of a functional or teleological, rather than ontological, motivation for pluralism.
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Note that, in the present context, mere scepticism about the existence of some entity
(e.g. numbers)—that is, the contention that there are no Gs—is not the kind of thing
we’re after.22 I’m assuming that we do not want to simultaneously hold that ‘7 is
prime’ is true and so 7 is prime, and that the number 7 does not exist. What we’re
after are reasons for thinking the relevant entities ‘cannot be so causally responsive’.
If our beliefs in some domain are concerned with entities that cannot enter the relevant
causal interactions, and yet (some of) our beliefs are true, then—since correspondence
is causal—we must understand truth in the relevant discourse non-representationally.
Lynch thus suggests an argument from (a) a causal-representational interpretation
of correspondence, and (b) the claim that causal representationalism does not apply
to certain beliefs, to (c) truth for the relevant beliefs being non-representational. (The
background assumptions required to get us to truth pluralism—whichwe’ll grant—are
that truth must at least sometimes be understood representationally, and that at least
some of our (atomic) beliefs in the (b) discourses are true in a substantive sense.)
So, we’ll first (Sect. 3.2) consider four ontological grounds for (b): that certain
beliefs concern entities that are (i) merely abundant; (ii) non-natural; (iii) abstract; or
(iv) mind-dependent. The case is more convincing for (i)–(iii) than for (iv). We’ll then
(Sect. 3.3) ask whether CAUSAL’s limited scope does, in fact, give us good reason to
go in for truth pluralism.
3.2 Causally impotent entities
3.2.1 Abundant, non-natural, and abstract entities
The case for merely abundant, non-natural, and abstract entities falling outside the
scope ofCAUSAL is straightforward, since in each case it follows almost by definition.
Merely abundant properties, recall, we introduced in contrast to “sparse” properties,
which ground genuine similarities between entities and hence are causal-explanatorily
important. Something’s being a turkey predicts and explains various things about what
it’s like and how it behaves. Its being quurkey does not do so, precisely because there
is nothing substantive that just the quarks and turkeys have in common. While Lynch
doesn’t consider merely abundant properties, if the distinction is in good standing,
then they are a good example of the type of thing that might fall outside the scope of
CAUSAL.
Lynch (34) seems to raise the point about non-natural entities almost in passing.
When discussing moral properties, he says that ‘it is difficult to know how wrong-
ness—even if we grant that it is a property—can be a natural property with which we
can interact.’ The thought seems to be that a moral property must be non-natural, as
per moral non-naturalism.23 Very roughly, non-naturalists argue that moral properties
are not subject to investigation by the natural sciences, and are not reducible to such
“natural” properties, but are rather autonomous entities of their own kind. The further
22 Though contrast Lynch (2008: p. 122).
23 ‘Natural’ is used in many ways in the literature, so perhaps this is not what Lynch had in mind. But the
suggestion is pertinent nonetheless.
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relevant thought is that they are thus not part of the causal order of things (otherwise
they would be subject to such investigation).
On the face of it, this is a surprising place to look for motivation for truth pluralism,
since it would be odd to combine moral non-naturalism with a non-representational
theory of moral truth. On the one hand, non-naturalists are traditionally the arch moral
realists, so it would be surprising to see them reject a correspondence conception of
moral truth. On the other, one might have hoped that going non-representational about
moral truth would enable us to do without postulating such exotic entities. Still, that
a partnership is surprising does not render it unworthy of consideration.
Finally, as Lynch (34) notes, abstract entities, in contrast to concrete entities, are
standardly taken to lack spatiotemporal location and hence to be causally inefficacious.
Paradigm abstract entities, like numbers, hereby straightforwardly fall outside the
scope of CAUSAL.
One might take issue with any of the foregoing, arguing that gerrymandered, non-
natural, or abstract entities are causally efficacious (and this would, in the end, be grist
to my mill). However, it’s plausible enough that such entities fall outside the scope of
CAUSAL that we’ll grant it for the sake of argument, to see what follows vis-à-vis
pluralism.
3.2.2 Mind-dependence
Another distinction that Lynch—and, indeed, many other pluralists—brings up in this
context is that between mind-independent and mind-dependent entities. According to
Lynch (33), naturalistic theories of representation like CAUSAL, and even its non-
naturalistic predecessors, are committed to:
‘[t]rue beliefs map[ping] objects that exist and have their properties mind-
independently. […] An object exists (or has some property) mind-independently
at some time just when it would continue to exist (or have that property) even if
there were no minds that represented it as having that property.’
He thus argues that, for instance, “legal propositions” fall outside the scope of
CAUSAL. But why think that CAUSAL is committed to the mind-independence of
the “worldly” relatum? In its defence, Lynch (33) only says that it is ‘a consequence
of the fact that representational views intend their position to be realist.’ So construed,
however, it is an additional bolt-on, and not a consequence, of the view. (Besides, I’m
sceptical that mind-independence is necessary for “realism”, in any non-stipulative
sense—see e.g. Barnes (2017).)
Why think that mind-dependence frustrates CAUSAL? One thought might be that
mind-independence is necessary for causal efficacy. But it would be, at best, surprising
tofindout that allmind-dependent properties and facts are causally redundant. Is Prince
William’s inheritance of Catherine Middleton’s estate in the event of her death not
caused by his beingmarried to her? Is someone’s beingfined for speeding not caused by
the fact that it is illegal?Many think that race and gender are mind-dependent (perhaps
because “socially constructed”); but presumably still want to say that someone’s race
or gender might cause them to be subject to various kinds of structural privilege or
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oppression. (One might respond that these are not instances of causation, but of non-
causal explanation. But to do this merely on the basis of mind-dependence seems ad
hoc.)24
One may concede that mind-dependent entities enter into causal relations while
thinking that there is a difference in the kind of causal role we attribute to them.
Take, for instance, Wright’s (1992: p. 196) notion of “width of cosmological role”.
A state of affairs has a “wide” or “broad” cosmological role only if it is ‘potentially
contributive to the explanation of things other than, or other than via, our being in
attitudinal states which take such states of affairs as object.’ One might suspect that
mind-dependent states of affairs have only narrow cosmological role. For instance,
that Prince William inherits Catherine Middleton’s estate seems to be explained by
the fact that the right people believe he is married to her. If all the explanatory work of
such states of affairs, and hence the causal work, goes “via” our mental states about
them, then it has only a “narrow” cosmological role. By contrast, that iron behaves
the way it does around magnets is explained in terms of its being magnetic, without
any intermediary reference to our mental states; so iron’s being magnetic has “wide”
cosmological role.25 However, even if mind-dependent states of affairs ipso facto have
narrow cosmological roles, this does not automatically have any bearing on CAUSAL,
since it is explicitly built into the definition of a narrow cosmological role that such
states of affairs can (directly, as it were) explain ‘our being in attitudinal states which
take such states of affairs as object’.26 If this explanation is not to be construed as a
causal explanation in the case of mind-dependent states of affairs, we need to be told
why not.
In that spirit, let me offer a tentative reconstruction of why one might take mind-
dependence to be incompatible with CAUSAL. As with the arguments considered in
Sect. 2, the principal issue concerns explanatory circularity. Suppose that instances of
marriage are grounded in our mental states; in particular, that whether or not someone
is married depends on whether or not (certain relevant) people believe that they are
married. (Note that this is a stronger condition than Lynch’s mind-dependence, since
it appeals to particular mental states.) Now, such beliefs are partially individuated by
the fact that they are about marriage: that <marriage> represents marriage. If we in
turn appeal to CAUSAL to explain this representational fact, we appeal to instances
of marriage to explain why this belief is about marriage. But instances of marriage
24 For this reason among others, it is perplexing that mind-dependence is so often alluded to as an obvious
motivating factor for truth pluralism, e.g. Cotnoir and Edwards (2015: p. 118); Edwards (2011: p. 29); Lynch
(2001: p. 724; 2004: p. 385); Pedersen (2006: p. 102; 2010: p. 93); Wright and Pedersen (2010: p. 210).
Note that I am not here suggesting that all, say, moral, institutional, or mathematical explanations are causal
explanations. All I’m objecting to is the idea that we can infer that certain explanations are non-causal on
the grounds that the relevant entities are mind-dependent.
25 Width of cosmological role plays a prominent role in Edwards’s overall theory: he (2018: p. 70) suggests
that narrow cosmological role is a sign that a property is merely abundant (and thus projected; meaning
truth in the relevant discourse is non-representational). Even if this is right, it would not affect the earlier
arguments.
26 One could maintain that some states of affairs have only super-narrow cosmological role, which rules
this out. Then, it seems, CAUSAL becomes straightforwardly circular. (This is one way of reading Lynch’s
(161–162) argument concerning moral properties.) This is risky. One might reasonably think that error
theory or fictionalism is more appropriate for such states of affairs: being a witch has a super-narrow
cosmological role because there are no witches.
123
Synthese
are meant to be grounded in beliefs about marriage; and these beliefs about marriage
will need to be explained in terms of instances of marriage… And so on, around and
around. So—the reasoning goes—one cannot use CAUSAL to explain the content of
concepts concerning mind-dependent properties, on pain of circularity.
As I say, I offer this reconstruction only tentatively; I am unconvinced myself.
(I’m not convinced that this need be viciously circular rather than a benign regress,
for example.) However, let’s grant it for the sake of argument, since I think using
mind-dependence as a basis for truth pluralism makes Lynch’s position much more
interesting. (Onewould be hard-pressed to deny that anything ismind-dependent, after
all.)
3.3 Criticism
To recap: Lynch argues from (a) a causal-representational theory of correspondence,
and (b) that causal representationalism does not apply to certain beliefs, to (c) that
truth for the relevant beliefs is non-representational.We’ve considered four ontological
grounds for (b): that the entities the relevant discourses are concerned with are merely
abundant, non-natural, abstract, or mind-dependent. In this section, I’ll raise three
objections to Lynch’s argument: the first concerning (b), the second concerning (a),
and the third concerning the inference from (a) and (b) to (c).
First, regarding (b), Lynch’s argumentative strategy presents a couple of problems.
He makes the case for (b) by discussing CAUSAL; but CAUSAL is explicitly a toy
theory, to be replaced by somethingmore sophisticated. It’s thus a live question towhat
extent the critique of CAUSALwill be a reliable guide to the scope of its sophisticated
successor. Stewart Shapiro (2009) makes this point with regards to <nitrogen> and
<gravitational field>:
‘To belabor the obvious, nitrogen does not “cause, under appropriate circum-
stances, mental tokenings of” [<nitrogen>]. […] For one thing, we are (almost)
always in the presence of nitrogen. Similarly, mental states with gravitational-
field-ish content are not causally responsive to an external environment that
contains gravitational fields.Every external environment contains a gravitational
field.’27
One option, of course, is to incorporate discourses that use such “theoretical” con-
cepts into (b), and thus place them outside the scope of correspondence. I take it this
would make the resultant pluralism less attractive to many. But Shapiro’s point is a
dialectical one: that the sophisticated theory may well capture such concepts, render-
ing CAUSAL an unreliable guide. As he puts it: ‘There may nevertheless be a scope
problem for the envisioned correspondence based property […] but we’ll have to wait
for details to find out what it is.’
More importantly, once reference has been secured for some concepts, there is
a natural extension of the program to secure reference to further entities. Consider
<quurkey> again. Suppose that <quark> and <turkey> refer to quarks and turkeys,
respectively, by virtue of standing in the right causal relation to quarks and turkeys.
27 See also Smith (2010) and Connolly (2012).
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Then we can define the concept of quurkeyness as before: x is quurkey iff (x is a
quark or x is a turkey).28 In this way, the causal account can provide a kind of “source
intentionality”, of which the intentionality of other concepts can be derivative. Indeed,
the structure of this strategy is enshrined inLewis’s (1970) proposal for “How toDefine
Theoretical Terms” (though Lewis is not committed to a causal derivation of source
intentionality). Very roughly, given a scientific theory—about, say, nitrogen—one can
“Ramsify” out the theoretical term: replace every occurrence with a variable, x, bound
by an existential quantifier. Your “Ramsified” theory says that there is an entity, x,
that has all the features that the theory takes nitrogen to have. Provided that the other
terms that occur are already meaningful (in our case, through having their reference
explained causally), <nitrogen> refers to the entity, supposing there is one, that satisfies
the description (or the best deserver). The point is: granting causal representationalism
for certain concepts, provided that your source intentionality is rich enough, one can
secure reference to further entities despite the absence of the relevant causal relation. If
such a strategy cannot be extended to accommodatemoral, mathematical, institutional,
etc. discourse, we need to be told why.
So, while it’s plausible that reference to merely abundant, non-natural, and abstract
entities cannot be secured through direct causal means, it is much more contentious
that such entities remain beyond the reach of a causal theory that is supplemented in
thisway.Merely abundant properties like quurkeyness are straightforwardly accounted
for; and moral functionalists already argue that reference to moral properties is best
understood in something like this way.29
Second, note that Lynch himself doesn’t provide much by way of argument for
(a). He states that contemporary versions of the correspondence theory are ‘widely
accepted in philosophy and implicitly accepted by many cognitive scientists and psy-
chologists’ (22); and then makes a case that causal representationalism is such a
contemporary version.30 Now, the tenor of the discussion suggests that Lynch sees
causal representationalism as indispensable to ‘the over-arching research program of
cognitive science [which] takes it that the mind—that is, the brain—is an organ part
of whose function is to represent the world around it’ (22). But this would be a con-
tentious claim indeed—that the brain represents the world around it is one issue; how
it does so is quite another, which might admit of non-causal explanation.31 CAUSAL,
or its sophisticated successor, may well be plausible for certain concepts; but we ought
to be open to a non-causal theory of representation, at least for certain other concepts,
should one be forthcoming.
28 This requires that the logical concepts involved in the definition are also meaningful. This is important,
but creates complications we need not get hung up on here.
29 E.g. Jackson (1998). While functionalism is typically employed by naturalists, the strategy itself is
compatible with non-naturalism.
30 I am willing to grant this for the purposes of this paper. But one might think of CAUSAL as a theory of
meaning or content, rather than truth. For instance, one might argue that CAUSAL is a theory about how
a proposition comes to be the content of a particular mental state (or expressed by a particular sentence);
while a theory of truth should tell us what it is for that proposition to be true.
31 Inferentialist and interpretationist competitors spring to mind. Williams (2020) argues that the latter can
concede that, and even explain why, causalists and inferentialists latch onto informative generalisations in
certain cases, thereby explaining the local attraction of the view that Lynch (e.g. 2009: p. 33) leans on.
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Which brings us neatly to the final, principal difficulty facingLynch’s argumentative
strategy.Lynch suggests that,where representation cannot be explained in causal terms,
some non-representational theory of truthmust be appealed to. But the most this could
show is that representation cannot always be cashed out in causal terms. It’s compatible
with this that it should be explained in non-causal terms for abundant, non-natural,
abstract, or mind-dependent entities; and thus that truth should always be a matter of
accurate representation. That is, we might appeal to a pluralistic theory of reference
determination, rather than truth.32
Lynch (162–163) is sensitive to something like this worry, but points out that com-
ing up with such a theory “seems difficult”. But now we come full circle. By Lynch’s
own lights, truth in the relevant domain consists in some non-representational prop-
erty, like superassertibility.33 Therefore, by his own lights an extensionally adequate
theory of reference determination is one that appeals to the relevant truthbearers being
superassertible (rather than true). For instance, suppose that the moral belief that x is
wrong is true iff it is superassertible.34 If this is right, we have at our disposal a sub-
stantive, non-causal theory of reference determination for ethical concepts: x is in the
extension of <wrong> iff <x> refers to x and the belief that x is wrong is superassert-
ible. But now, having explained reference in terms of superassertibility, the truth of
the belief can be explained “building-block”-style, in the manner Lynch prefers. Com-
ing up with a pluralistic theory of reference determination is thus no more (or less!)
difficult than coming up with a pluralistic theory of truth. And if CAUSAL and its ilk
count as explications of correspondence, so does this. Once again, theoretical economy
endorses the theory that does not bifurcate the nature of truth as well as reference.
Finally, it’s worth noting that, as far as I can see, nothing in the structure of this
dialectic hinges on the fact that Lynch is appealing to a causal theory of correspon-
dence. I thus suspect this kind of challenge could be pressed against any argument for
pluralism that goes via arguing, on ontological grounds, that your preferred represen-
tational conception of truth has limited scope.
Lynch’s attempt to motivate pluralism via a causal-representationalist theory of
correspondence is therefore uncompelling. On the one hand, a sophisticated causal
representationalism can in general explain reference to entities with which we do not
causally interact in the correct way, meaning the scope of the theory is still an open
question. On the other, the causal constraint on representation is itself unmotivated;
and, indeed, pluralists themselves look to be committed to the extensional adequacy
of a non-causal theory in just those cases in which the causal account fails.
4 Conclusion
Drawing on material provided by pluralists themselves, we’ve surveyed a variety
of potential ontological grounds for truth pluralism: that certain entities (i) literally
32 As Lynch (34, fn. 16) seems to concede. This is Shapiro’s suggested modification; see also Sher (1998).
We might think of the extension just discussed as introducing such a bifurcation: reference determination
for source intentionality is causal; otherwise it’s descriptive.
33 For Lynch (171–177), it is a property he calls concordance.
34 Superassertibility applies more naturally to sentences than beliefs; but the point I’mmaking is structural.
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exist in a different way; (ii) are projected; (iii) are merely abundant; (iv) are non-
natural; (v) are abstract; or (vi) are mind-dependent. In such cases, the Edwards-style
strategy is to argue that what is so depends on what is true; so truth must be non-
representational. The Lynch-style strategy is to argue that truth is non-causal, and
hence non-representational. While not hopeless, we’ve seen that neither strategy is
especially compelling. The additional premises needed to move from such ontological
distinctions to truth pluralism are unattractive, often only serving to bifurcate the nature
of truthwhenmore conservative options are available. Thismakesmepessimistic about
the prospects for building truth pluralism on ontological foundations.
But even if that is right, all is not lost. The metaphysical strategies we’ve been
considering start from the idea that there is an important dimension of ontological
variation between the entities that different discourses are concerned with, and try to
argue for truth pluralism on this basis. The inevitable question is: why not just appeal
to variation in the kinds of entities that sit on one end of the correspondence relation,
rather than bifurcating the nature of truth?
Contrast this starting point, however, with metaethical expressivism. Expressivists
characteristically deny that we get an informative explanation of what’s going on in
the moral domain by postulating a realm of moral facts or properties that we use moral
talk to describe. Instead, we should postulate a set of pro- and con-attitudes—attitudes
of approval and disapproval, say—that we use moral talk to express. Such states have
a “desire-like” functional role, rather than a “belief-like” one: functioning to push us
into action, rather than to represent the world around us. The crucial disanalogy is that
the expressivist does not postulate entities of a peculiar ontological kind to explain
moral discourse. Rather, she does not postulate entities for this explanatory purpose at
all. The expressivist does not appeal to an ontological distinction, but a functional one:
moral thought and talk serves a non-representational function. At the outset, then, there
is no question of moral truth consisting in accurate representation of the moral facts;
for there are no facts to sit on the “worldly” end of the correspondence relation.35 The
version of “double-counting” worry we’ve been considering thus cannot get a grip.
Alas, expressivists have not tended to be truth pluralists. Early expressivists denied
that moral discourse is truth-apt36; contemporary expressivists, especially “quasi-
realists”, typically go in for deflationism.37 But while I cannot argue it here, I suspect
that there are good reasons for expressivists to be dissatisfied with a deflationary
conception of moral truth.38 Truth pluralists would be well-served if so. The third
35 However, see Ridge (2014) for an ambitious attempt to “earn the right” to a correspondence conception
of moral truth on expressivist grounds.
36 Ayer (1936).
37 Blackburn (1993) and Gibbard (2003).
38 Three principal difficulties concern: (i) accounting for first-personal moral fallibility (that is, the possi-
bility that my own moral judgements might be incorrect) given that we’re not to postulate moral facts to
determine (in)correctness; (ii) earning the right to truth-conditional semantics for moral discourse; and (iii)
the problem of “creeping minimalism” (Dreier 2004). Given a deflationary conception of truth, the notion
appears too thin to help the expressivist make sense of a gap between what she takes to the be case, morally
speaking, and what is in fact the case, morally speaking; to explain the meaning of moral sentences; or to
distinguish quasi-realism from realism. Indeed, despite his deflationary sympathies, the resources Black-
burn uses to explain moral fallibility are strongly reminiscent of Wright’s superassertibility—a connection
Blackburn (1993: 22, fn. 10) himself explicitly draws. However, these are large, complicated issues.
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way between deflationism and correspondence is to appeal to a substantive, but
non-representational, conception of moral truth. If we must nonetheless go in for
a representational conception of truth elsewhere—such as in discourses that do serve
a representational function—then the result is truth pluralism; one grounded in an
underlying functional or teleological diversity, rather than an ontological one.
Moreover, I’d be surprised to find that those sympatheticwith a non-representational
conception of truth in a particular discourse were not also attracted to a non-
representational explanation of the discourse’s function. Indeed, this seems a more
natural home for truth pluralism than one which sees such discourses as uniformly
representational in function, but concerned with different kinds of entity. Of course,
it remains to be seen if such a strategy is viable, or if it runs into “double-counting”
worries of its own. But given what I’ve argued here, pluralists ought to be interested
in finding out.
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